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Energy Transition and Revolution in Tunisia:
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Laurence Rocher
Institut d’urbanisme, Université Lyon 2, CNRS-EVS, France
Éric Verdeil
CNRS-EVS, Université de Lyon, France
Energy transition in Arab countries is usually addressed as an economic and tech-
nological issue. This analysis of Tunisian policies on renewable energy argues that
it must be understood from a political and geographical perspective. Energy policy
in Tunisia is dominated by STEG, the national utility for electricity and gas, which
has held a monopoly since independence and enjoys strong historical legitimacy for
its achievements. Beginning the 2000s, however, national energy self-suﬃciency
was challenged and the government pushed for renewable technologies, which
STEG was wary of and whose implementation it has slowed. The Tunisian revolu-
tion has strongly shaken the balance of power in the country, allowing for multiple
and multi-level criticisms of STEG and for the forging of new alliances for renew-
able energy projects. Some of these projects are on the verge of implementation.
Because they rely on different geographical visions and varied technologies,
however, they may in the end prove unevenly successful.
Keywords: energy transition, renewable energy, electricity, socio-technical collec-
tive, politics, Tunisia, revolution
La transition énergétique dans les pays arabes est généralement traitée comme un
enjeu économique et technologique. Analysant les politiques énergétiques tunisiennes,
en particulier la promotion des énergies renouvelables, nous défendons l’idée que la
transition énergétique doit être comprise dans une perspective politique et géogra-
phique. La politique énergétique en Tunisie est dominée par la STEG, l’opérateur
public en charge de l’électricité et du gaz ; elle détient le monopole depuis
l’Indépendance et bénéﬁcie d’une forte légitimité historique pour ses réalisations. Mais
depuis les années 2000, la Tunisie n’est plus autosuﬃsante au plan énergétique et le
gouvernement pousse au développement des énergies renouvelables, pour lesquelles la
STEG se montrait méﬁante en freinant leur mise en place. La révolution tunisienne a
fortement ébranlé les rapports de force dans le pays et a suscité de multiples critiques
de l’opérateur public à plusieurs échelles, tandis qu’émergent de nouvelles alliances en
faveur du développement des énergies renouvelables. Certains projets sont sur le point
d’être réalisés, mais comme ils reposent sur une diversité de visions géographiques et de
technologies variées, leurs chances de succès pourraient être inégales.
Mots clés : transition énergétique, énergie renouvelable, électricité, collectif sociotech-
nique, politique, Tunisie, révolution
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In several countries of the Arab world, the release of the 2013 World
Energy Outlook (OECD and IEA 2013) has been met with concerns
about subsidies on energy rates. These subsidies are perceived as the
major hindrance to a transition toward modern, and specifically renew-
able, energy sources. Such views can be criticized, however, as they reduce
energy policy to a technology- and economy-driven process that occurs
at the national level. It can be argued that energy transition, understood
as the move from one energy mix structure to another, depends not only
on such national policies led by government but also on the complex
interplay of an array of actors with various and often competing interests
and agendas. Politics, with its specific temporality,i needs to be reintro-
duced in the analysis of energy transition. In addition, these various and
competing actors operate at scales that often cross over the national scale;
some actors may rely on specific, place-based local resources or deploy
their strategy at a scale wider than the nation. International geopolitics is
indeed a core pattern of energy issues. This article explores these issues
through a case study of energy transition policies in Tunisia before and
after the 2011 revolution.
Tunisia, a middle-income Mediterranean country, is characterized
by its dependence on fossil-fuel energy sources, which has continually
increased over the past 15 years. This context is a powerful driver for
energy transition, and Tunisian authorities have thus naturally expressed
a desire for “energy efficiency” via energy-saving measures and the
promotion of renewable energy. Yet compared to neighbouring coun-
tries, Tunisia has been slow to truly commit to a program to develop
renewable energy: in 2011, renewable energy accounted for only about
3 % of its installed capacity (1 % from wind turbines), as opposed to 4 %
wind and 26 % hydro in Morocco in 2010 (Bahgat 2013). The Tunisian
situation can be described as a largely blocked energy transition,
although several recent initiatives do seem to be moving toward
unblocking. Our hypothesis is that this blocked transition must be seen as
the result not only of inadequate legal and financial tools to allow for the
emergence of renewable energy but also of political values and choices.
Representations of energy production and distribution as a means of
national independence and pride explain why the national energy
company has been granted the power to control policy making in this
sector. The 2011 revolution, which brought a  brutal change in the power
balance, challenges this situation and allows for competing private
actors, but also unions and local discontents, to openly contest the
national company and advance new claims. They propose strategies that
articulate differently the technologies and scales of the energy system. In
this article we consider the availability of the energy resources that renew-
able energy is potentially meant to replace (the depletion of hydrocarbon
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resources in Tunisia and neighbouring countries) and the layout of the
existing or envisaged electrical networks that affect the operating condi-
tions and profitability of renewable energy. In other words, we must care-
fully analyze the geographical dimensions through which energy
transitions occur.
The first section of the article sets out the theoretical framework of
the study, specifically how politics and geography articulate with the
framework of transition studies. The second section describes the organi-
zation of the Tunisian energy sector and its recent moves toward devising
an energy transition strategy. The third section analyzes the impact of the
Tunisian revolution on the energy sector; the final section presents the
geographical dimensions that shape several alternative projects chal-
lenging the existing organization. 
The Spatiality and Politics of Energy Transition
Over the past few years, our understanding of energy transitions has been
substantially enhanced by research that has moved away from analyzing
public policy related to energy transition and instead focused more on the
role of temporalities that are unique to regimes or niches, particularly by
reintroducing representations and agencies into analyses (Geels and
Schot 2007). Beyond public policy, it is the social and political interests
and the relationships of power between protagonists—in sum, politics—
that need to be examined, acknowledging that “there is a politics to tran-
sition management” (Shove and Walker 2007, 766). Drawing on
examples from the field of energy, several researchers have criticized tran-
sition management studies for, among other things, their failure to take
into account political dimensions “that the formal mechanisms of transi-
tion management are ill equipped to negotiate” (Meadowcroft 2009,
335). Yet analyses still often look essentially at regimes and niches to
explain the evolution of socio-technical systems based on the more or less
fundamental changes that affect them. Geels and Schot (2007) suggest
understanding socio-technical landscapes as an essential variable likely
to create disruptive pressure that can alter a regime’s balance and
encourage innovation in some niches. But in the literature, the notion of
the socio-technical landscape is usually understood in a relatively narrow
and limited sense that tends to leave out of the analytical framework
certain broader socio-historical characteristics relating to, for example,
political upheavals. Landscapes are generally characterized by long-term
time spans, though some rapid changes can be caused by disruptive
events (Raven, Schot, and Berkhout 2012). Although such changes may
not appear directly related to the socio-technical context, the reframing
and adjustments they impose do tend to greatly influence transitions. The
2011 revolution in Tunisia can be seen as a disruptive event that had indi-
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rect but significant consequences for the energy transition process. 
Just as the broader historical and political context must be taken into
account, the same is true of the spatiality and territoriality of transitions.
The need to seriously consider space and scale dimensions within transi-
tion processes has been noted in recent academic work focusing on
sustainability transitions (Coenen et al. 2012), socio-technical transitions
(Raven et al. 2012), or energy transitions specifically (Bridge et al. 2013).
These studies all suggest that in multilevel perspective analysis,
geographic approaches are implicit but partial, according predominance
to the national scale and emphasizing national differences (Coenen et al.
2012) but without considering the spatiality of transition processes. This
study of Tunisian energy policy focuses on the reshaping of the national
level, which is being stressed by external and internal pressures. It relies
on an approach that assumes that spatial scale is relative and that it is
“socially constructed through networks of actors and cut[ting] across
territories” (Raven et al. 2012, 70). Gavin Bridge et al. (2013) recently
noted six geographical components that help unpack the spatial dimen-
sion of energy transitions: location, landscape, territoriality, spatial
differentiation, scaling, and spatial embeddedness. These dimensions
take on meaning and produce effects in close connection with the political
time scales mentioned above; as such, they cannot be separated in
analyses. 
To test our hypotheses about the blocking and the unblocking of the
Tunisian energy transition, we examine the socio-technical collectives
involved. According to Nadaï and Labussière (2011), and in the frame-
work of Actor–Network Theory, we define these collectives as distrib-
uted agencies that we can analyze through four basic elements. The first
element consists of the actors involved in energy issues and in trying to
find solutions. We examine the alliances, connections, and differences
between these entities, be they public or private, local, national, or inter-
national in scale, and how they evolved over time. This leads to a second
element: the visions (unique or shared) that such actors have of the goals
they pursue and of the interests they defend. We look more particularly
at the scales of reference behind such visions, showing that since the revo-
lution, the emergence of new collectives has brought into play some new
geographical considerations that question the prevalent national vision
of energy supply. The third element is the technologies at work in energy
production and consumption systems, which we address through the
different types of renewable energy developed in Tunisia (mainly wind
and solar energy). Finally, to understand the conditions under which
such technologies are rolled out, we must examine the policy instruments
used or envisaged to implement them. These four elements are intrinsi-
cally connected and interact with one another; taking their temporality
into account allows us to showcase this and to address the spatial and
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material configurations that they convey and produce. 
This article is based on research undertaken in Tunisia beginning in
2010.ii Several field visits and about 30 interviews with administrations,
firms, and local NGOs were complemented by an extensive survey of
press and administrative documentation. While doing fieldwork and
obtaining administrative data beyond the documentation available
online was quite difficult, things have become much easier since 2011,
particularly with respect to STEG, the national utility. But the political
stalemate in Tunisia has not only delayed the implementation of new
policy measures but also triggered a lot of speculative investments, which
we found useful to investigate, even though they may never be realized.
Energy Transition under Centralized Control
This section analyzes the blocked energy transition toward renewable
energy in Tunisia during the 2000s. In the name of a vision of national
energy independence, and using electricity supply as a political tool to
promote development, the national electricity and gas utility has used its
long-standing political clout to control and regulate diversification initia-
tives. The measures taken in the Tunisian Solar Plan in 2009 illustrate a
policy that remained under the state utility’s control.
From Self-Sufficiency to Energy Stress: 
A Chronology of Tunisia’s Strategy for Energy Efficiency
Since 1962, energy policy in Tunisia has been jointly conducted by the
government, through its ministry responsible for energy issues, the
Ministry of Industry and Technology, and by the Société Tunisienne
d’Electricité et de Gaz (STEG, the Tunisian Gas and Electricity
Company), the national utility. STEG was created in 1962 with the
mandate to produce, transport, and distribute electricity and to transport
and distribute natural gas across the country. It has played an influential
role in the supply of energy, leading to an electrical distribution rate of
100 % in cities and 98.5 % in rural areas. From the outset, the government
conferred on this state-owned utility a strong political mandate that
combined two goals: reaching national energy independence in a context
of decolonization in a country with fewer energy resources than neigh-
bouring Algeria and Libya; and socio-economic development via electri-
fication of remote or socially deprived areas, using a tariff policy based
on large subsidies to certain categories (e.g., working-class neighbour-
hoods, rural areas). 
In terms of energy resources, Tunisia was quite well off until the turn
of the millennium thanks to the exploitation of its oil and gas resources.
Investment in a distribution network for natural gas was encouraged
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starting in the 1980s, with the goal of reducing public spending on
imports of oil-based energy commodities.iii Moreover, the Tunisian
government levies a tax on Algerian natural gas that transits across the
country en route to Italy. But pressures on energy supply in the 2000s
made it increasingly necessary to promote renewable energy and energy-
saving measures. In 2000, the national energy balance tipped from being
positive to running a deficit. Local oil resources were running out just as
demand was increasing due to demographic growth, rising standards of
living, and economic growth. In 2004, the increase in international hydro-
carbon prices made the consequences of this deficit a palpable issue in the
state’s budget,iv while increased household equipment levelsv have
boosted power demand to such an extent that meeting middle-of-the-day
demand during the summer months has become increasingly difficult,
making the “summer peak” a truly alarming issue. These trends have
spurred the government to examine how energy diversification could
encourage renewable energy solutions.
The first law on energy efficiency, passed in 1985, created what is now
called the Agence nationale de maîtrise de l’énergie (ANME, the
National Energy Efficiency Agency), under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Industry. ANME’s mandate is to implement government
measures related to renewable energy and energy efficiency. Its concerns
diverge totally from STEG’s vision and are influenced by the interna-
tional cooperation organizations with which it has worked, first mainly
French and German, then with the European Union with the rise in the
1990s of the Medener network in the context of the Barcelona Process.vi
Despite this broadening of the actor network in the energy sector, STEG
has retained its pre-eminent position. The situation of energy stress after
2004 created momentum for alternative approaches. In 2004, the
Tunisian Parliament passed a law on energy efficiencyvii that introduced
a series of measures to encourage reductions in energy consumption
(Sahtout 2012). Several measures targeted the construction sector and
household equipment: implementation of energy audits for multi-unit
buildings, thermal regulations for new buildings with a series of new
architectural standards, and attempts to curb energy use through infor-
mation campaigns and labelling of household equipment and air-condi-
tioning appliances, and promotion of solar water heaters (Benalouache
2013; Bolzon, Rocher, and Verdeil 2014). The goal was also to allow for
the production of renewable energy. These measures were accompanied
by a whole series of subsidies, tax breaks, and financial incentives
financed by the Fonds national de maîtrise de l’energie (FNME, the
National Fund for Energy Efficiency), a fund created in 2005viii with the
help of international aid (e.g., Agence française pour le développement,
World Fund for Environment). They nonetheless had very different
results in the different sectors involved. The year 2009 marked a new stage
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in the process. Previous measures had produced only limited results,
notably in terms of new generating capacity, while the impact of
increased hydrocarbon prices was growing. At the same time, interna-
tional initiatives promoting renewable energy were flourishing, notably
the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Desertec project (Moisseron 2010).
The Tunisian government then launched a new strategy that resulted in
the adoption of the Tunisian Solar Plan (TSP), the Tunisian version of
the Mediterranean Solar Plan, following two presidential energy-saving
campaigns (2005–7 and 2008–11). The implementation of the policies and
projects outlined in the TSP was overseen by a new law on energy effi-
ciency,ix followed by a series of decrees.
The Tunisian Solar Plan: The Reaffirmation of State-Dominated
Steering of the Energy Transition
Tunisian authorities’ desire to encourage the development of renewable
energy was particularly visible in the TSP, published in September 2009.
This plan—which is misnamed, since solar energy is actually not its sole
focus—is more of a roadmap to 2030 in favour of energy efficiency and
different types of renewable energy, notably wind power, solar energy,
cogeneration, and biomass. The document lists 40 potential projects with
the goal of reaching a capacity of 4.7 GW by 2030 through the involve-
ment of both public and private sectors. However, the institutional and
financial means made available for this plan fell short and have resulted
in only two initiatives. The first is a law that encourages self-production
(i.e., production to meet internal needs) by industry actors. We will return
to this point in more detail in the second section, but it is worth noting
that by limiting itself to self-production, the TSP fell short of its stated
goals for developing solar and wind power projects. The second is the
creation of a specialized subsidiary of STEG—STEG Renewable Energy
(STEG-ER)—responsible for researching sites and implementing
projects as well as for managing renewable electricity power plants.
STEG-ER was immediately commissioned to manage the Sidi Daoud
wind power plant in Cap Bon (54 MW) and several studies by private
investors interested in renewable electricity projects. 
The TSP’s limited outcomes are evidence that the state operator has
maintained its historical stranglehold over the definition and implemen-
tation of Tunisian energy policy. In the early 2000s, international donor
agencies, notably the World Bank, challenged STEG’s monopoly and
recommended a partial privatization of Tunisia’s electrical sector (World
Bank 2004). A combined cycle plant was built and opened by a private
American–Japanese firm, and the government held discussions with
potential investors with a view to authorizing production in privately
managed wind power plants. But under a new manager, STEG repudi-
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ated this orientation and turned its back on the private sector. The
drafting of the 2009 strategy embodies STEG’s logic of resistance to the
various forms of pressure weighing on it in order to help maintain control
over the sector. The strategy was wholly elaborated by the CEO of STEG
and the director general of ANME, who was later appointed CEO of
STEG-ER in 2010—and who happened to be a close friend of the Ben Ali
family.x Senior management at ANME was not consulted on this deci-
sion, however. STEG-ER, a private subsidiary, is majority controlled by
STEG, which intends to use it as a tool to branch into renewable energy.
In such a patronage-based economy, it is quite likely that the control of a
market like this provided under-the-table commissions for people close
to the regime. Several such scandals have been revealed recently involving
STEG-managed deals. This episode clearly shows the weight of interests
and politics rather than a transition consensually piloted by a govern-
ment that truly wants to equip itself with the best possible tools. The
result is that the energy transition was stalled, since nothing (and, in
particularly, no private-sector projects) had been undertaken, aside from
the modest STEG projects.
Towards an Energy Revolution?
The Tunisian revolution of January 2011 was a turning point that shook
up the existing collectives and challenged power relations, notably the
pre-eminent position held by the STEG–STEG-ER collective. These
transformations opened windows of opportunity for dissenting actors
who, in the name of visions previously marginalized, demanded that
balance be reset in Tunisian energy policy and suggested tweaking the
existing instruments or finding new solutions. In this section, we first
highlight how the socio-technical collective acting in the name of the state
monopoly was weakened, then examine the emergence and empower-
ment of an alternative collective focused more particularly on wind
power and/or photovoltaic technology, conceived on a national scale.
Finally, we look at a third type of collectives that is part of a broader scale
(the Maghreb and Euro-Mediterranean) focused on solar technologies
(large photovoltaic power plants and/or concentrated solar plants
[CSPs]).
The Weakening of the State Monopoly
The Tunisian revolution was a political event whose starting point had no
direct connection to the country’s energy situation. In the Tunisian
context, at least, most analysts do not draw a direct connection between
the revolution and the energy situation, pointing instead to a combina-
tion of social and regional inequalities resulting from a neo-liberal devel-
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opment mindset marked by state withdrawal and the exacerbation of
predation for the benefit of those close to the ruling family (Ayeb 2011).
The revolution has nonetheless had major consequences for the energy
sector, thanks to the intersection of several causes.
Firstly, social protest focused on living conditions and, in particular,
on essential services. Part of the population stopped paying their elec-
tricity bills in the months following the revolution: in April 2011, esti-
mates in the press (which were confirmed in our interviews) were that
roughly one-third of customers were not paying their bills. Despite
various attempts to recover these sums by toning down the usual repres-
sive measures (e.g., fines, cutting off customers who fail to pay), the
number of unpaid bills continued to increase, and by 2013 amounts
owing had reached TND530 million (vs. TND160 million in 2010).xi The
non-payment of bills expressed, on the one hand, a critique of the elec-
tricity collection system, and especially of the television tax, which is
based on customers’ electricity bills; and, on the other hand, a belief that
electricity and gas were too expensive, just as demand was increasing
greatly (Bennasr and Verdeil 2014). The population’s sensitivity to
energy prices has pushed the government to greatly limit increases to the
cost of energy, even though subsidies to the energy sector in 2013 repre-
sent 10 % of the national budget and are fuelling an increasing deficit.
September 2012 saw the first increase since July 2010, amounting to 2 %
for individual users and 8 % for industrial and business users. Between
unpaid bills and the increasing cost of subsidies, STEG was financially
weakened, which affected its ability to invest. It thus became difficult for
STEG to initiate new projects, notably those involving renewable energy,
although it currently claims to want to.
In addition to its financial problems, STEG has experienced internal
dissent of unprecedented proportions, led by the electricity union.
Unionism is very strong in Tunisia and was never totally subjugated to
the Ben Ali regime (Yousfi 2013). The electricity union has rallied effi-
ciently in recent years against projects related to the sub-contracting of
distribution; it was at the forefront in decrying problems at the privately
operated Ghannouch combined power plant, which has been in opera-
tion since 2000. The union is very critical of renewable electricity genera-
tion projects proposed by independent investors and criticized the
creation of STEG-ER as a foreshadowing of STEG’s privatization.
Further, a victorious strike against sub-contracting the management of
the Sidi Daoud power plant in Haouaria to STEG-ER beginning in 2010
resulted in the cancellation of the initiative (STEG-ER’s first) and called
into question a similar initiative planned at the Bizerte power plant. This
struck a strong blow at the STEG–STEG-ER collective, which was
formed, according to the TSP, to promote the development of capacity
from renewable sources. Most employees seconded to STEG-ER
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returned to the parent company, and by mid-2013 the subsidiary, which
is unsure of its future, was nothing more than a design office with about
20 employees, mostly mid- and high-ranking executives.
In addition to these sources of structural and internal weakness, the
increased freedom of speech enabled disagreement and demands to be
publicly voiced through press releases and public demonstrations.
Likewise, within the government, caution has given way to open and
outright criticism, and the people we interviewed were also much clearer
in expressing their dissatisfaction with the state monopoly. One example
is the emergence of unprecedented opposition to STEG’s construction of
a wind farm (total size 190  MW) on two sites in the Bizerte region,
Metline-El Alia and Jabal Kchabta. The project was launched in 2010; by
2011, it had begun attracting various forms of opposition from villagers
over disturbances caused by the related construction work (notably
roads) and the lack of economic outcomes, jobs, and local development.
The failure to consult with the population about this decision before and
during the process fuelled criticism. Some facilities were sabotaged,
causing a lot of damage and a halt in production that lasted for more than
six months (Verdeil 2013). Some demands, notably those related to jobs,
are typical of the types of protest seen during the revolution (Hibou
2011); more broadly, this opposition voices a critique of centralized
development as embodied and defended by STEG. A January 2012 press
release following an information meeting aimed at citizens is telling: it
advances points of general interest, such as the provision of electricity
across the country—from which local citizens also benefit—and then
justifies the refusal to grant them the preferential rates they demand with
arguments about the equality of all users. This line of thinking is an
example of the failure to specifically take into account the local level in
development and programming of energy transition—a failure that is
surely not unique to the technologies of energy transition.xii Yet the very
existence of this information meeting attests to a radical change tied to the
revolutionary context. This localized objection to STEG is only an echo
from a larger chorus of criticism of STEG’s monopoly and its inability to
efficiently lead the energy transition, and it goes along with calls for a
change in the regulatory framework in view of authorizing private invest-
ment in renewable energy. 
STEG: The Target of Converging Criticism
Criticism of STEG, as gathered from several interviews and synthesized
in this section, is built around three pillars. The first criticizes a company
that is quite resistant to technological innovation and shows an overall
preference for proven thermal technologies despite their elevated costs
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(costs hidden in part by indirect subsidies). One allegation is that STEG
has not fully mastered new renewable energy technologies, and thus has
trouble assessing their profitability; another is that it overestimates the
inconveniences of connecting them to the grid (e.g., the issue of intermit-
tent generation). Hence, it is alleged that STEG underestimates the
potential amount of renewable energy that could be connected to the
grid. Moreover, the lack of flexibility in its procedures is said to affect the
efficiency of system maintenance (e.g., through long delays in purchasing
replacement parts or choosing manufacturers from whom parts are noto-
riously difficult to track). Some of this criticism—from the ANME as
well as certain industry actors and observers—has been corroborated by
the Tunisian Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes 2011). It should be
noted that STEG has addressed such critiques by underscoring its desire
to experiment with pilot projects to learn how to master new technologies
and understand their parameters with a view toward achieving national
self-sufficiency.
The second pillar of criticism is more ideological and involves
acknowledging the end of STEG’s historical role in distributing Tunisia’s
electricity, observing that times have changed and that energy indepen-
dence—and, in particular, diversification into renewable energy—can be
managed by private operators. This critique also focuses on STEG’s
claim to be—and actual role as—both judge and defendant, that is, its
ability to influence the ministry in charge of energy (theoretically the
regulator) and, in doing so, actually defend its own interests and vision
(e.g., regarding the planning of the power system). This type of critique is
notably advanced by senior ANME managers. Talks underway about the
appointment of an independent regulator are proof that the lines are
capable of shifting with respect to the redistribution of regulating power. 
The third pillar is more political in these revolutionary times and
highlights STEG’s collusion—or, at least, that of some senior
managers—with the Ben Ali regime. Among several cases revealed in the
press is that of Enerciel, a firm involved in wind power, which has been in
a lawsuit against STEG since 2006 over an agreement for the running of
a wind farm near Bizerte, signed in 2003 and then cancelled as a result,
according to Enerciel’s CEO, of Ben Ali’s family intervention. This open
critique—although nuanced slightly by different actors—is a common
basis for calls for shared regulatory instruments in order to move into a
new phase of energy transition. 
Forging an Alliance for Energy Transition: Toward a New Law
The counterpoint to the decline of the socio-technical collective formed
by STEG and its subsidiary has been the expansion and growth of new
collectives focused on promoting wind power and centralized photo-
voltaic systems. These groups are composed of several types of actors,
whose approaches and interests initially converged in their criticism of
the existing regulatory and institutional framework but who diverge in
their practices depending on the technology they promote. 
The main institutional actor is ANME, which is officially in charge
of Tunisia’s energy strategy and of elaborating the TSP. In the post-revo-
lutionary context, its new director general has publicly acknowledged the
failures and shortcomings of the strategy launched in 2010 and said that
ANME needs to play a leading role in elaborating new goals (Mahroug
2012). ANME is supported in its approach by GIZ, a German interna-
tional cooperation agency that has provided a dozen experts in charge of
prospective studies on the energy mix, the solar plan and strategy, jobs,
and so on. More specifically, in June 2011, GIZ helped organize a
seminar on self-production from renewable sources, which was impor-
tant in crystallizing criticism of the regulatory framework and in
condemning STEG’s attitude toward private investors in the renewable
energy sector (GIZ and ANME 2011). German cooperation in Tunisia
was significantly reinforced in the late 2000s as part of a policy to
promote the export of specialized industries in the energy sector (in which
German firms are known to excel).
Another series of actors is composed of several industry representa-
tives. Cement manufacturers, large industrial companies (Groupe chim-
ique tunisien), and oil producers form a first subgroup that consists of
representatives from the public and private sector interested in producing
their own electricity and reselling the surplus to STEG. A second
subgroup consists of firms specializing in renewable energy, notably wind
power and photovoltaic systems, that would like to get involved in the
renewable energy production market, either as subcontractors of the first
group or as independent producers. In addition to this group of economic
actors, there are a few associations such as the Association tunisienne
pour l’énergie éolienne (Tunisian wind power association). This diverse
group of actors is united in its criticism of the law of 2009 (which encour-
ages self-production from renewable energy sources) and its by-laws,
which they see as providing insufficient incentive to truly encourage self-
production—indeed, no such project has ever materialized. The problem-
atic features for industry actors and their institutional counterparts are
the maximum resale threshold of 30 % for surplus electricity, which is
deemed too restrictive, and the unsubsidized buyback price, which does
not allow attractive remuneration for energy from renewable sources.
Because launching a self-production project is too difficult and not
rewarding enough for firms that have not mastered the technology them-
selves, they push for renewable energy firms be authorized to produce
and resell electricity.
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Public acknowledgement of this problem has led to lobbying for a
review of the law and for the adoption of a broader law authorizing the
production of privately owned renewable energy through more encour-
aging feed-in tariffs and the possibility of competitive bidding for projects
that exceed a certain capacity (preliminary talk about the new law,
initially expected in the fall of 2013, mentioned 10 MW for photovoltaic
power and 30 MW for wind power). The drafting and approval of this
new law were still underway as of December 2013, but the new prime
minister (formerly the industry minister) is supporting the move. 
Technologies and Geographical Visions of the 
New Energy Transition Collectives
This final section highlights the diversity of the existing socio-technical
collectives beyond their common lobbying for a new regulatory frame-
work. We analyze this diversity based on the collectives’ preferred tech-
nologies, geographical visions, and territorial strategies, from the local to
the transnational level (see Table 1).
Enerciel and the Creation of a Local Socio-technical Collective
Thanks to the drop in production costs for wind-powered electricity, a
large number of projects are planned in this sector, either via self-produc-
tion or direct production, although all are conditional on the approval of
a new regulatory framework. Enerciel Tunisia is a subsidiary of the
American UPC group, which specializes in wind power and is already
well established in Italy and Morocco. Their preparations for the intro-
duction of competition provide an interesting illustration of how a poten-
tial energy transition is being constructed in connection with the needs of
Tunisian firms and in a manner that is attentive to local conditions.
Enerciel Tunisia has been surveying the market since the late 1990s and is
interested mainly in forging partnerships with (industrial) firms seeking
renewable electricity solutions with long-term supply agreements, as it
has already done in Morocco. Despite its disappointment regarding the
hopes for setting up on the Tunisian market in 2003, it has not stopped
scouting for sites with strong wind potential. The originality of Enerciel’s
approach is the creation of what we can call local socio-technical collec-
tives. This involves knowing and fully mastering the wind-power poten-
tial of its sites, thanks to the installation of wind masts, and securing the
support of the local population by recruiting site security guards and
maintaining ongoing social relationships based on knowledge of and
respect for the population (e.g., by participating in family events such as
funerals or weddings). We were not able to check these claims in the field,
but we can underscore how this approach differs from the way STEG
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conducted its project in Bizerte, discussed above. 
The two next examples both highlight strategies aimed at developing
renewable (mainly solar) energy from deserts for the European market
(Cameron 2013), but the two private firms favour different technological,
geographical, and political assemblages.
Dii in Tunisia: Europe and Globalization, from a Catalyst to a Hindrance
to Energy Transition
Dii (Desertec Industry Initiative) is a consortium of industry actors
founded in 2009 to take advantage of the Sahara’s solar potential and
opportunities to export to Europe. Dii’s 2050 strategy is based on studies
showing that constructing a power system that connects the north and
south shores of the Mediterranean, combined with renewable energy-
generating capacities on the south shore, could meet 90 % of the needs of
this geographical area by that date for a rate 20–30 % below current rates
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TABLE 1
Three Tunisian collectives pushing for renewable energies since 2011
                              Enerciel Tunisia            Desertec Ind Initiative                TuNur
Actors                    Small branch of an         A consortium of              Consortium of an
                              American firm led           transnationa                    English firm l
                              by a Tunisian                  energy firms                    (Nur Energy Ltd) +
                              entrepreneur                                                         Tunisian partners
Vision, objective,   Wind power for                To produce 90 % of         2 GW CSP in South
interests, scale       the local market              EUMENA electricity        Tunisia for the
                                                                     Power in 2050 (1 GW)    European market
Technology            Wind farms                     Wind farms + PV +          CSP (to meet the 
                                                                     CPS transported on        evening European 
                                                                     the Tunisian grid +          peak) + special 
                                                                     HVDC Line to Sicily        transportation line + 
                                                                                                             HVDC line to Rome
Political, legal,       Revamped Tunisian        Euro-Mediterranean       Intensive lobbying of 
and financial          Energy Law (feed-in        geopolitics                      government institu-
instruments            tariff + up to 30 MW                                                tions + local scale 
                             free access to the                                                  (citizens + governor)
                              market)                                                                 
                              Long-term sales             Global finance                Specific tailored law
                              agreements with 
                              industrial Tunisian 
                              customers                       
                                                                     Liberalization of the        European investors
                                                                     Tunisian electricity 
                                                                     market
(Desertec Industrial Initiative [Dii] 2012). A few years after its launch,
however, not much progress has been made. Several of its founding
shareholders—notably the German firms Siemens and Bosch—have
withdrawn, and open differences of opinion have appeared between the
Desertec Foundation and Dii (Calderbank 2013). Reduced growth in
Europe, contradictions in the European Union’s energy strategy, and
conflicting interests between the states of the Maghreb and Spain, which
has an excess of renewable sources of electricity, have slowed if not under-
mined the initially grandiose perspectives behind the consortium’s
creation. While it is not our intention here to assess this initiative,
focusing on the consortium’s strategy in the Tunisian context highlights
some of the obstacles it has faced.
Dii Tunisia was extremely supportive of the TSP framework
proposed in 2010 and signed a statement of agreement with STEG-ER.
In 2011, based on a study that used data provided by STEG, Dii Tunisia
proposed a plan to the government for the construction of 1  GW of
renewable electricity. This plan included the construction of 40 produc-
tion units, of which two were CSP plants of 200 MW and 220 MW respec-
tively and the remainder were wind-power and photovoltaic units
ranging in size from 10 to 30 MW. The electricity produced was destined
primarily for export but was also meant to meet local demand on a basis
still to be defined. The plan was rejected by both STEG and the Tunisian
government. Not only was the existing legal framework inadequate, the
project’s intention to export also required major regulatory changes to
the framework for electricity buyback to line up with the liberalized
European market—which in the long run would have required ending
both electricity subsidies and STEG’s monopoly. Given the current situ-
ation, all of this was deemed inopportune and impossible by a former
STEG CEO (Eurogroup Consulting 2012), notably because of the issue
of true pricing. More concretely, STEG also justified its refusal by under-
scoring the network’s insufficient capacity, which it claimed was limited
to 244 MW whereas the geographical distribution of Dii’s chosen setup
would have allowed for the integration of 1 GW. Indeed, according to the
plan, the proposed new units were located mostly in the centre of Tunisia,
on high plateaus with strong wind-power potential. Another attempt
with a less ambitious scope was rejected in 2012. According to a represen-
tative from Dii Tunisia, this rejection showcased STEG’s reluctance to
experiment in a period of major energy stress, indicating that STEG
preferred to continue with familiar technology even if it was more costly.
For Dii, the local integration of these production units was a minor issue,
since the chosen sites—mostly in the south for the photovoltaic plants—
were publicly owned (station transformers) or part of oil leases that actu-
ally needed new electric capacity. Thus the main obstacle, according to
Dii, was not at the local level but, rather, the increased cost of credit terms
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in a country whose revolutionary context was preoccupying international
financial institutions and whose credit ratings were negatively affected as
a result. Dii’s analysis of the setbacks to energy transition, like that of
other actors, points to STEG’s and the government’s outdated and incor-
rect visions as well as to a poor fit with international conditions that were
initially thought to be drivers of energy transition but are now seen as
major obstacles instead.
TuNur: Between Local Lobbying and Trans-Tunisian Perspectives
Launched by the British Nur Energy firm in association with two
Tunisian partners already involved in the energy sector, the TuNur
projectxiii is interesting for its similarities to and differences from the Dii
case. The project involves constructing 2 GW in several phases of CSP in
southern Tunisia by 2020, mostly destined for export. The TuNur project
has the Desertec Foundation label but has no economic or financial ties
with Dii, which is actually more a competitor. This initiative has been the
focus of major media marketing in Tunisia, underscoring the potential
number of jobs it would create—estimated at 22  000, roughly 2  000
permanent jobs on site and the rest related to the construction and
creation of a solar sector in Tunisia. The TuNur strategy has involved
lobbying at the national level for instruments that would make the project
compatible with national regulations, mobilizing locally on the planned
site, and highlighting the advantages of its integration at the European
level.
At the national level, in addition to its media campaign, TuNur has
met with state and government representatives, including the president of
the republic and the president of the Constitutional Council. Moreover,
TuNur has successfully lobbied to have measures allowing export abroad
(to Europe) without use of STEG’s network included in the law currently
in preparation, thus circumventing STEG and, in particular, its argu-
ments about the network’s limited capacity. Further, seizing on the polit-
ical context and, more specifically, the need to address popular demand
for regional development and jobs, TuNur has managed to convince the
Tunisian government to place the project in the portfolio of the commis-
sion on large-scale infrastructure projects created by decree in January
2013. It is currently under examination pending approval.
At the local level, TuNur has conducted detailed studies on the
chosen site in the Kébili region and is attempting to address and over-
come the common objections to CSP technology—specifically, the issue
of water consumption for cooling steam in the turbines, which could
represent a serious problem at a desert site. The choice of tower tech-
nology should allow for atmospheric cooling, and the panels would be
washed using wastewater from the region’s palm groves. Tunur has also
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lobbied local authorities, notably the governor, to defend the project to
the government, in a region that has been hit particularly hard by unem-
ployment. Finally, through an advertising campaign aimed at citizens—
the potential beneficiaries of the promised jobs—TuNur has also built up
strong local expectations, which have been reported in the Tunisian press
(“Le mégaprojet” 2012; “Kébili” 2013; TAP 2012).
At the European level, TuNur has stressed two advantages of its
project. The first is related to the nature of CSP technology, which can
produce solar energy in phase with peaks in European demand (in the
evenings, even after the sun has set). Second, TuNur has chosen a connec-
tion point to the European grid near Rome, avoiding the heel of the
Italian boot and its undersized network. A study by British researchers,
financed by TuNur, has underscored these advantages (Strbac,
Pudjianto, and Hewicker 2012).
TuNur’s multi-level strategy has not eliminated all uncertainty, as
some observers have pointed out; in particular, uncertainty remains
about the necessary funding and the ability to secure land in the target
zone and for the passage of high-voltage power lines. Nevertheless, it is
worth underscoring the work done on geographical specificities at the
different levels and the ability to seize opportunities in a political context,
which is also unique. 
All three of the examples discussed in this section illustrate that
beyond regulatory challenges, the concretization of energy transition
must involve new practices and new alliances that articulate specific
actors and technologies in different locations and milieus, as well as
between places (electricity buyers are located in places other than where
the energy is produced). 
Conclusion: Energy Transition Entangled in Political Revolution
Current debates on energy transition in Tunisia focus on the major trends
in the energy mix and, in particular, on the proportion of energy needs
that renewable energy sources should fill. Given the existing setbacks to
this necessary diversification, discussion has focused mostly on the legal
and financial instruments that would enable the private sector to partici-
pate in the necessary investment. While such focus on instruments—or
“regimes,” to employ the vocabulary used in transition management
studies—is necessary, our research shows that other factors are just as
important. The present study has produced three important results.
The first is the decisive influence of changes in the socio-technical
landscape, here notably prices on global hydrocarbon markets and the
Tunisian revolution. The move from self-sufficiency to energy stress has
marked a turning point and has proved a deeply destabilizing factor in the
previously unequivocal national policy of a state that has always
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entrusted an operator under its authority with a mission to supply energy,
conceived of as a guarantor of national unity. The state has been forced
to acknowledge geopolitical tension related to relations with neigh-
bouring states and to accept the consequences of changes in prices set by
global markets. The Tunisian revolution, although not directly related to
the energy situation, has created a shake-up in established political hier-
archies and legitimated new forms of protest and open criticism such that
the thinking behind and contextual legitimacy of Tunisian energy policy
(and of the STEG monopoly more specifically) have been challenged, and
has in turn given free rein to alternative and competing visions and inter-
ests. These two events clearly correspond with Geels and Schot’s (2007,
403) definition, which sees socio-technical landscapes as exogenous
contexts that “do not determine, but provide deep-structural ‘gradients
of force’ that make some actions easier than others”—these, according to
Van Driel and Schot (2005), include “rapid external shocks, such as wars
or fluctuations in the price of oil” (qtd. in Geels and Schot 2007). While
the sensitivity of energy transitions to external shocks is not unknown, it
is rarely taken into account in most analyses, despite introducing a very
high degree of uncertainty and helping to turn such transition processes
into moments of protest and potentially chaotic change, depending on
the extent of challenge in the political arena.
The second lesson from this study is that energy transition indeed
touches on the highly political nature (as opposed to the technical, legal,
or financial dimension) of the positions held by the different actors. Quite
clearly, the socio-economic interests of actors play an important role;
examples include the STEG union’s rejection of privatization, which is
seen as putting the company at risk; and the desire of private investors to
introduce competition. More generally, access to energy has strong polit-
ical meaning in Tunisia, where it is bound up with pride in national self-
sufficiency, national integration, and access to a form of material
modernity. For STEG, which has played a major role in this story, resis-
tance to current critiques makes more sense in the context of this imag-
ined political reality. Conversely, actors who contest the STEG
monopoly embrace other global visions, for example, those based on
ecology. Because they are unable to impose their visions, however, they
have tried to focus the debate on issues surrounding the cost of transition
by emphasizing the declining cost of renewable solutions against rising
subsidies.
Third, our research shows that energy transitions cannot be under-
stood without examining their geographical and territorial components.
The analytical framework provided by Bridge et al. (2013) allows us to
highlight the extent to which the dominant geographical dimensions have
changed in the Tunisian context. The vision held by the state and STEG
is based on the prevalence of a territoriality of national scope, which is
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embodied by very strong centralization built over the long term. As this
collective has weakened, arguments in defence of a single public operator
have shifted toward arguments about social tariffs as a means to ensure
that citizens’ needs are taken into account, another way of presenting
itself as the herald of national unity. The new collectives that we have
identified embody visions that highlight new geographical considera-
tions. In terms of scaling, some promoters of renewable-source electrical
power plants have challenged the dominant national scale by attempting
to introduce production destined for export from Tunisia (in the form of
large-capacity units whose location is determined by solar resources),
whereas others want access to the grid (in the form of smaller units whose
location is determined by the necessary resource—wind or sun). STEG
then uses technical arguments about the grid’s geographically uneven
capacity to defend its monopoly position. The size of renewable energy
units, their locations, and the distribution network as such form three
inseparable elements at the root of justifications advanced by all parties
in the current controversy. Finally, local protests against new units, as
well as the attention paid by potential investors to the socio-economic
conditions of units’ implantation, are proof that the Tunisian revolution
has ramped up considerations about spatial differentiation and uneven
development. Indeed, according to Bridge et al. (2013, 337), energy tran-
sition is “not limited to energy systems themselves, but extends to their
patterns of economic growth and development.”
Notes
1 The term temporality refers to humans’ perception of and the social organi-
zation of time. Hence the specific temporality of politics is defined by its
non-linear nature, its particular time scales and rhythms, some of which are
unpredictable.
2. Our research is funded by a grant from the French Agence nationale de la
recherche for the project COLLENER (Sociotechnical Collectives and the
Energy Transition) (2012–15), directed by A. Nadaï et O. Labussière. A
first version was presented at the 2013 meeting of the Royal Geographical
Society, held in London on 26–28 August 2013, as part of a session titled
“Emerging Socio-technical Collectives and New Geographies of the Energy
Transition,” which they convened. We thank them and other researchers
from the team for their constructive remarks on this research, as well as our
Tunisian counterparts and informants for their availability.
3 The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption went from 26 % in
1990 to 54 % in 2011, and from 9 % to 19 % of final energy consumption in
the same period.
4 In 2007, the Tunisian state allocated 12 % of its budget to importing energy
commodities: crude oil, residual fuel oil, and liquefied petroleum gas.
5 Since 1984, STEG has assessed household energy consumption every five
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years. These assessments show an explosion in the number of refrigeration
devices (40 % of electricity consumption in 2004) and air-conditioning
devices (total number of units increased fourfold between 1999 and 2004)
(L’énergie, No. 75, 07/2009).
6 The Medener network is an international association of Mediterranean
energy agencies that fosters the exchange of best practices in the field of
energy. The Barcelona process was launched in 1995 by the EU and
Mediterranean partners as a framework for managing bilateral and
regional relations.
7 Law #2004-72 of 2 August 2004 on energy efficiency.
8 Law #2005-82 of 15 August 2005 created the FNME, which is financed by
a tax on the licensing of new vehicles and air-conditioning devices.
9 Law #2009-7 of 9 February 2009, which modified and expanded on Law
#2004-72 of 2 August 2004 on energy efficiency.
10  According to an ANME employee interviewed in Tunis in December 2012.
11 According to STEG’s press releases, quoted in Tunisian online newspapers.
12 In 2011, Tunisia experienced a fuel-supply shortage because of the impact
of the crisis in Libya on the country’s southern region, as well as several
labour strikes and citizens blocking access to drilling platforms (“Impact”
2011).
13  TuNur is a play on words: Tu refers to Tunisia (Tunis in Arabic), and Nur
means light.
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Cadène, Philippe and Dumortier, Brigitte, Atlas des pays du Golfe. Paris:
Presses universitaires Paris-Sorbonne, 2011.
Certainly the most complete publication of its type available in French,
the Atlas des pays du Golfe is a perfect complement to the now dated
Géographie universelle, the well-known French 1990s classic in geog-
raphy. The atlas is written by two geographers: Brigitte Dumortier,
lecturer at the Université Paris-Sorbonne and head of the Department of
Geography and Urban Planning at Sorbonne–Abou Dhabi University,
and Philippe Cadène, geography professor at the Université Paris-
Diderot. The authors are already familiar with the geographical descrip-
tion of the region: Dumortier published a Géographie de l’Orient arabe in
1997 and an Atlas des religions in 2002.
In five thematic chapters, this atlas offers a geographical overview of
the Gulf, described as a “méditerranée au sens braudélien.” (p.7). It then
concentrates on the challenges posed by the management of local energy
resources and proceeds to map contemporary urban, economic, and
social changes in the region. A chapter is devoted to the study of states or
parts of states located within 100 km of the coast. The final chapter
focuses on the region’s important cities, including Dubai, Basra,
Dammam, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Bandar Abbas.
In their introduction, the authors explain their reasons for producing
an atlas on the Gulf. Their project is clear from the outset, exemplified by
the first map: its aim is not to produce a synthesis of what is already avail-
able on the subject but, rather, to fill a gap in French cartographic works
on the area. Apart from the Atlas historique du golfe persique du XVIe au
XVIIIe siècles, no academic atlas is devoted to this region. Dumortier and
Cadène’s book is a novelty in that it treats the Gulf separately and is
devoted entirely to the region.
As expected, the main physical features of the Gulf are described,
followed by the history of this space where the Persian and Arab spheres
meet. It is considered a “crossroads of civilizations,” although, except for
the Batinah region of Oman, it was always on the fringes of the major
empires; the Gulf became important only with the advent of the colonial
empires in the East Indies and their related conflicts. The authors then
focus on the strategic importance of the Gulf, which contains more than
50 % of the world’s oil and 40 % of global natural gas reserves. Based on
official documents, they provide a detailed description of the region’s
energy challenges and its refining and transportation infrastructures.
They also discuss finding an alternative route to the Straits of Hormuz in
case they become inaccessible under conditions of war. These challenges
are so important that the region is subject to political and military insta-
bility: three Gulf wars, territorial tensions between Iran and the United
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Arab Emirates, and sectarian problems between much diversified reli-
gious and ethnic groups.
But Dumortier and Cadène have chosen to emphasize the rapid and
deep transformations currently underway in the Gulf region, including
examples of the expected themes—urbanization, migrations, the impor-
tance of free zones, facilities offered to financial and real-estate investors,
and so on. They also focus on some lesser-known topics, such as the rein-
forcement of heritage tourism (highlighted by a rapid growth in the
number of tourists to the region), the setting up of an important industrial
sector (metallurgy, aluminum, cement, and chemicals), and the opening
of numerous branches of foreign universities and local cultural and
artistic centres. Dumortier helpfully describes the emergence of this new
cultural economy using the example of the Sadiyaat cultural district of
Abu Dhabi and a chronology of the education system in Dubai.
Using the same framework, the atlas presents the eight states
bordering the Gulf, outlining their political history, the establishment of
their contemporary political institutions, the diversification of local
economies, the strengthening of natural and cultural heritage tourism,
and the particular demographic aspects of their societies. For example,
the study of Saudi Arabia shows the significant asymmetry in population
density and its relation to the country’s history and economic geography;
the authors also explain the territorial fragmentation of the seven Arab
Emirates that constitute the eponymous state and whose complex territo-
rial formations were subject to the tribal considerations of the 19th and
20th centuries. 
The urban aspects of the Gulf coast are thoroughly approached.
While Dubai is the region’s best-known city, other important urban
centres are well described: Kuwait, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat, but
also Bandar Abbas and even Abadan, among others. City master plans
are illustrated and explained, though without questioning their feasibility
or their current situations. However, evaluations of five of these large-
scale projects are lacking; for instance, the Masdar Eco-city project,
located near Abu Dhabi International Airport, is currently on hold, as is
Abu Dhabi’s 2030 development plan, whose public transport networks
plans are being reconsidered.
The atlas contains more than 120 maps, which are mainly quantita-
tive and drawn using official data, as well as 10 figures, 10 tables, and a
dozen diagrams. It is summed up by a synthetic diagram showing the
“système mégalopolitain littoral en émergence,”which captures the main
urban centres but somehow omits Teheran, a city as important as Riyadh
in Gulf affairs, while referring to it as “capitale d’un État considéré comme
ennemi” in the accompanying text (p.113). The last chapter concludes
with what seem to be the results of the CITADAIN research program,
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although this program is not explicitly mentioned in the text.1
The Atlas des pays du Golfe is certainly the best publication on the
Gulf region currently available for scholars, students, and the general
public, bringing together the latest data on the human, urban, geography
of the region; it should be compulsory reading for anyone interested in
both shores of the Gulf.
Note
1. The Citadain program studies the process of emerging metropolitan regions.
It aims to improve the definition of such phenomenon and analyses the legal,
political and various parameters in deciding the metropolitan region. The
program compares Middle East and Indian worlds to arrive at a meaningful
and workable concepts and methods.
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